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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jesse Carl Riendeau appeals from the district court's intermediate 
appellate decision affirming his conviction for misdemeanor driving under the 
influence of alcohol (DUI). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on March 31, 2013, Coeur d'Alene City Police 
Officer Mario Rios contacted Riendeau after obseNing him fail to maintain his 
lane of travel while driving. (Mag. Div. Tr., 1 p.5, Ls.18-23, p.7, L.22 - p.13, L.2, 
p.48, L.2 - p.49, L.1, p.93, L.14 - p.95, L.1.) Riendeau's speech was slurred, his 
movements were slow and lethargic, and he failed field sobriety testing. (Mag. 
Div. Tr., p.13, L.3 - p.13, L.19, p.14, L.12 - p.23, L.6, p.49, L.1 - p.50, L.11, 
p.95, L.2 - p.97, L.6.) Officer Rios arrested Riendeau for DUI and transported 
him to the Kootenai County Jail. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.23, Ls.8-12, p.50, Ls.12-13, 
p.97, Ls.7-8.) There, the officer checked Riendeau's mouth for foreign 
substances, instructed Riendeau not to belch, burp or vomit, and monitored 
Riendeau for 15 minutes. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.24, L.11 - p.25, L.18, p.50, Ls.15-21, 
p.97, L.9 - p.98, L.2.) During the 15-minute obseNation period, Officer Rios 
read Riendeau the standard Idaho administrative license suspension (ALS) 
advisories. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.25, L.21 - p.26, L.9, p.50, Ls.22-24, p.98, Ls.3-5.) 
At the end of the 15-minute obseNation period, the officer asked Riendeau to 
1 The transcripts of the hearings conducted at the magistrate level (cited herein 
as "Mag. Div. Tr.") appear at pp.283-390 of the Clerk's Record. 
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take a breath alcohol test on an lntoxilyzer 5000 breath test machine. (Mag. Div. 
Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.5, p.30, Ls.21-23.) Riendeau took the test without 
objection. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.30, L.24 - p.31, L.9, p.51, Ls.8-10, p.98, Ls.5-9.) 
The results of the test showed Riendeau had a breath alcohol content (BAC) of 
.17/.18. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.31, Ls.12-13, p.51, L.11, p.99, Ls.18-20; R., p.10.) 
The state charged Riendeau with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p.6.) Riendeau 
filed a motion to suppress the breath test results, contending they were the fruit 
of an unlawful traffic stop and, alternatively, that the reading of the ALS 
advisories rendered his consent to the breath test invalid. (R., pp.25-37, 150-
57.) He also filed a motion in limine to exclude his breath test results, 
contending the failure of the Idaho State Police (ISP) to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA) in 
adopting Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other methods for breath 
testing "makes all such testing too unreliable for use at a criminal trial under I.C. 
§18-8004." (R., pp.140-49; see also R., pp.38-139 (supplemental materials filed 
in support of motion in limine).) After a series of hearings, the magistrate denied 
Riendeau's motions. (R., pp.158-67, 172-73; see generally Mag. Div. Tr.) 
Riendeau entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right on appeal 
to challenge the denial of his pretrial motions. (R., pp.174, 177-80.) The 
magistrate accepted Riendeau's plea, entered judgment, and placed Riendeau 
on probation. (R., pp.180-82.) Riendeau timely appealed to the district court (R., 




Riendeau states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether the Idaho State Police have properly promulgated 
rules for the administration of breath testing. 
II. Whether the Idaho State Police have promulgated rules that 
ensure accuracy as required by I.C. § 18-8002A and I.C. § 
18-8004(4). 
Ill. Whether State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d 219 (Idaho Ct.App.2013), 
is manifestly wrong and should be overruled. 
IV. Whether the Administrative License Suspension advisory 
coerces and invalidates the defendant's consent to providing 
a breath sample under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Riendeau failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts in denying Riendeau's 
motion in limine to exclude the breath test results? 
2. Has Riendeau failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts in denying Riendeau's 
motion to suppress the breath test results based on Riendeau's assertion 
that the mere reading of the ALS advisories rendered his consent to the 




Riendeau Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
The Magistrate Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying Riendeau's 
Motion In Limine To Exclude The Breath Test Results 
A. Introduction 
Riendeau challenges the denial of his motion in limine to exclude the 
results of his breath test, arguing as he did to the magistrate and district courts 
below that the accuracy of those results is inherently unreliable for two reasons. 
First, he argues that the breath test results were inadmissible because 
ISP has failed to comply with its statutory duty to establish methods to ensure 
the reliability of breath test results in general. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) The 
Idaho Court of Appeals recently considered and rejected this precise argument in 
State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. 
Riendeau has presented no cogent reason why Besaw should be overruled, nor 
has he demonstrated from the record that the testing procedures utilized in his 
case actually produced an unreliable result. Having failed to do so, Riendeau 
has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to exclude the test results on 
this basis. 
Second, Riendeau argues that the failure of ISP to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in creating SOPs and manuals for breath 
alcohol testing renders those SOPs and manuals void and all BAC testing based 
on those standards too unreliable for use at a criminal trial. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.11-20.) This argument fails for several alternative reasons. First, nothing in 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) requires formal rulemaking as a prerequisite to the admissibility 
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of results of breath tests performed pursuant to methods approved by ISP. 
Second, if ISP's creation of the SOPs is agency action governed by the 
requirements of the IAPA, Riendeau's exclusive means for challenging such 
action was through the judicial review provisions of the IAPA; he has no standing 
to raise, and neither the lower courts nor this Court have jurisdiction to consider, 
a challenge to the validity of the SOPs as a basis for excluding breath test results 
in a criminal case. Finally, even if this Court reaches the merits of Riendeau's 
argument, correct application of the law shows the SOPs are not rules and, as 
such, no compliance with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA was 
required. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." Isl 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." Isl (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
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"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is 
challenged, [the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact 
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 
134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including 
whether the state has satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission 
of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, are subject to free review. State v. 
Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338,339,882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Riendeau Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Based On His 
Claim, Already Rejected In State v. Besaw, That ISP Has Failed To 
Establish Methods To Ensure The Reliability Of BAC Test Results 
In order to have the results of a breath test admitted as evidence at trial, 
the state must make a foundational showing that the administrative procedures 
which ensure the reliability of the test have been met. State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 
734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 (Ct. App. 2011 ); State v. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 
979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127, 129, 867 P.2d 
1001, 1003 (Ct. App. 1993)). To satisfy this foundational requirement, "the state 
may rely on I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides an expedient method for admitting 
BAC test results into evidence when the analysis is conducted pursuant to [Idaho 
State Police ("ISP")] standards." State v. Uhlry, 121 Idaho 1020, 1022, 829 P.2d 
1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord Healy, 151 Idaho at 737, 
264 P.3d at 78; State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 411, 973 P.2d 758, 763 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Specifically, that statute provides: 
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Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining 
the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory 
operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by 
the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and 
certification standards to be set by that department, or by any other 
method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for 
alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method 
approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in a 
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a 
witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). "If the State elects to proceed under§ 18-8004(4), it must not 
only show that the test equipment was approved by [ISP] but also that the 
equipment was operated and the test administered in conformity with [ISP] 
standards." Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 411, 973 P.2d at 763 (citing State v. Bell, 
115 Idaho 36, 39-40, 764 P.2d 113, 116-17 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
Riendeau acknowledges that, pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), breath test 
results are admissible if they were obtained in conformity with ISP methods 
meant to ensure the reliability of the results. He argues, however, that no such 
methods actually exist because ISP has, in several instances, modified its SOPs 
for breath alcohol testing by replacing what were once mandatory testing 
procedures with testing recommendations that need not be uniformly complied 
with, thereby "render[ing] the SOPs incapable of ensuring accuracy" of breath 
test results, generally. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Riendeau's argument fails 
because it is merely a rehashing of the argument already considered and 
rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 142-
44, 306 P.3d 219, 227-29 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. 
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Like Riendeau, Besaw argued "that although ISP is charged by statute 
with adopting alcohol concentration standards meant to ensure the reliability of 
test results, the agency has abdicated this responsibility by replacing standards 
with testing recommendations that are not meant to ensure the accuracy of test 
results but, rather, to facilitate the admissibility of test results." Besaw, 155 Idaho 
at 143, 306 P.3d at 228 (emphases original). Specifically, he argued that 
because ISP had "changed a number of former 'must' testing requirements to 
'should' recommendations within the SOPs," the SOPs effectively fail to set forth 
any standards for breath testing. kl at 143-44, 306 P.3d at 228-29. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed and, in so doing, rejected Besaw's 
argument, which was based on the dissenting opinion in Wheeler v. Idaho 
Transp. Dept., 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied, that 
"nonmandatory standards [are] tantamount to no standards at all." Besaw, 155 
Idaho at 144, 306 P.3d at 229. Although the Court was troubled by some of the 
information Besaw presented "about the manner in which the SOPs for breath 
testing have been developed or amended," the Court was not persuaded by any 
evidence before it "that the SOP procedures are incapable of yielding accurate 
tests." kl Because Besaw failed to present any evidence "establish[ing] that the 
test procedures actually authorized by the SOPs and applied in Besaw's case 
[were] incapable of producing reliable tests," the Court found "no error in the 
magistrate court's denial of Besaw's motion to exclude the test results from 
evidence." kl 
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The reasoning and result of Besaw are controlling in this case. Like 
Besaw, Riendeau argues that ISP has replaced the word "must" with the word 
"should" in several provisions of the SOPs.2 (Appellant's brief, p.10.) And, like 
Besaw, Riendeau contends that the replacement of what were once mandatory 
breath testing methods with nonmandatory methods has resulted in there being 
no "method" at all to ensure the accuracy of breath test results. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.7-11.) Like Besaw, however, Riendeau has failed to present any 
evidence to demonstrate the SOPs, as amended, are incapable of yielding 
accurate results. Nor has he even argued, much less demonstrated, that Officer 
Rios failed to comply with any of the "recommended" procedures in administering 
the breath test in this case or that any such failure actually affected the accuracy 
of his test results. 3 Because he has failed to do so, Riendeau, like Besaw, has 
failed to show any basis for exclusion of the breath test results in his case. 
2 Although failure to follow a procedure that "should" have been followed would 
not have prevented the admission of the test result, Riendeau would have been 
free to argue that any such failure affected the weight the jury should give the 
evidence. 
3 Riendeau identifies only two "instances" in which "the SOPs have been 
modified so that the word 'must' has been replaced by the word 'should"': "1. 
The necessity to have the correct acceptable range limits and performance 
verification standard lot number set in the instrument prior to evidentiary testing"; 
and "2. The need to monitor the subject for fifteen minutes prior to the test to 
ensure there is no alcohol being regurgitated or in the mouth." (Appellant's brief, 
p.10 (citations omitted).) Riendeau does not contend Officer Rios failed to 
perform either of these procedures, nor does he challenge the magistrate's 
findings that Officer Rios properly calibrated the breath testing instrument and 
that he monitored Riendeau for the recommended 15-minute period before 
administering the test. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.97, L.20 - 98, L.2, p.99, Ls.5-20.) 
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Riendeau acknowledges the holding of Besaw but asks this Court to 
overrule it. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) As support for his request, Riendeau 
merely repeats the arguments that were presented to and rejected by the Court 
in Besaw. (Compare Appellant's brief, pp.10-11 with Besaw, 155 Idaho at 142-
44, 306 P.3d at 227-29.) That Riendeau believes Besaw was wrongly decided 
does make it so. Riendeau has not presented any new argument and has not 
otherwise pointed to anything in the record to demonstrate that Besaw has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise. Having failed to do so, Riendeau has 
failed to demonstrate any basis why Besaw should be overruled. See State v. 
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (controlling precedent will 
not be overruled "unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the 
holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust" (citations 
omitted)). The district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of 
Riendeau's motion to exclude the breath test results (on the claimed basis that 
there exist no methods to ensure the reliability of the results) must therefore be 
affirmed. 
D. Riendeau Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Excluding His Breath Test 
Results Based On His Claim That ISP Did Not Comply With The Formal 
Rulemaking Requirements Of The IAPA In Adopting The SOPs For 
Breath Alcohol Testing 
1. Nothing In I.C. § 18-8004(4) Requires Compliance With The 
Rulemaking Requirements Of The IAPA As A Prerequisite To The 
Admissibility Of Results Of BAC Testing Performed Pursuant To 
Methods Approved By ISP 
Idaho's DUI statute states it is unlawful for a person with "an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as 
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shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle" on a road or place open to the public. I.C. § 18-
8004(1 )(a). Subsection (4), in turn, sets forth a formula of grams of alcohol per 
210 liters of breath upon which upon which "an evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration shall be based" and states that such breath tests shall be 
performed by an approved laboratory or "by any other method approved by the 
Idaho state police." I.C. § 18-8004(4). That subsection continues: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the 
results of any test for alcohol concentration and records relating to 
calibration, approval, certification or quality control performed by a 
laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any 
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be 
admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of 
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing 
procedure for examination. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
As contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4), ISP has approved certain methods 
for breath alcohol testing and standards for the administration of such tests, and 
those approved methods have been set out by ISP in the form of "Standard 
Operating Procedures" and training manuals (hereinafter collectively "SOPs"). 
(See R., pp.); State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 140, 306 P.3d 219, 225 (Ct. App. 
2013), review denied. Riendeau does not contend that, in administering his 
breath test, Officer Rios failed to comply with any of the methods or procedures 
set forth in the SOPs. Rather, he argues the methods themselves are invalid 
because there is nothing in the record indicating that ISP complied with the 
rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., in adopting the 
SOPs. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-20.) Riendeau's challenge to the manner in 
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which ISP approved the methods for breath alcohol testing does not show any 
basis for exclusion of his breath test results because nothing in the governing 
law requires compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA as a 
prerequisite to the admissibility of results of BAC testing performed pursuant to 
methods approved by ISP. 
Promulgation of rules is required under the IAPA only where "specifically 
authorized by statute." I.C. § 67-5231(1). The plain language of I.C. § 18-
8004(4) states that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court," 
results of BAC testing "shall be admissible," without the necessity of producing 
expert testimony, if the test was "performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the 
Idaho state police." (Emphasis added). Nothing in this statute authorizes or 
requires ISP to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in 
approving the methods for determining an individual's breath alcohol 
concentration, nor does the statute make compliance with the IAPA a condition 
precedent to the admissibility of BAC test results in a criminal proceeding. To 
the contrary, the statute provides that such results are admissible if the test was 
performed by "any ... method approved by" ISP. I.C. § 18-8004(4). Because 
Riendeau has never argued, much less demonstrated, that Officer Rios failed to 
comply with any of the methods set out in the SOPs in administering his breath 
test, he has failed to show any basis for exclusion of his test results in the 
criminal case. 
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The state recognizes the legislature has, in a related statute, conferred 
rulemaking authority upon ISP for purposes of administrative license suspension 
proceedings. Specifically, I.C. § 18-8002A provides: 
(3) Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho 
state police may, pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, 
prescribe by rule: 
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under 
this section; and 
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be 
performed to comply with the department's requirements. Any 
rules of the Idaho state police shall be in accordance with the 
following: a test for alcohol concentration in breath as defined in 
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and subsection (1) (e) of this section 
will be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol 
testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state 
police in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time 
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing .... 
I.C. § 18-8002A(3). By its plain language, however, the rulemaking authority 
granted by I.C. § 18-8002A does not extend to the approval of methods for 
breath alcohol testing contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4). To the contrary, the 
statute limits what ISP may prescribe by rule to the determinations of "[w]hat 
testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section [18-8002A]" 
and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to 
comply with the department's requirements." The statute also mandates that any 
rule so prescribed recognize that, for purposes of the license suspension 
provisions of I.C. § 18-8002A, a test for breath alcohol concentration is valid "if 
the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state 
police in accordance with section 18-8004." In so doing, the legislature clearly 
indicated that the approval of breath testing equipment and methods required 
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under I.C. § 18-8004 is not itself subject to the rulemaking requirements of the 
IAPA. 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that ISP approve BAC testing 
methods by formal rulemaking. Therefore, Riendeau's argument that the SOPs 
were not adopted pursuant to the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is 
irrelevant to the admissibility of his breath test results under this section. 
2. If ISP's Creation Of The SOPs Is Agency Action Governed By The 
Requirements Of The IAPA, Riendeau's Exclusive Means For 
Challenging Such Action Was Through The Judicial Review 
Provisions Of The IAPA 
Riendeau argues that, because administrative license suspension 
hearings "held per I.C. § 18-8002A are agency action controlled by [the IAPA]," 
ISP's approval of methods for BAC testing for purposes of admissibility of test 
results under I.C. § 18-8004(4) must also be "agency action falling under the 
requirements of [the IAPA]." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) For the reasons set forth 
in Section I.D.1, supra, Riendeau has failed to show that ISP's compliance or 
lack thereof with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is at all relevant 
to the determination of the admissibility of his breath test results under l.C. § 18-
8004(4). If Riendeau is correct, however - and ISP's approval of BAC testing 
methods for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004(4) is agency action governed by the 
IAPA - Riendeau had no standing to bring, and neither the lower courts nor this 
Court have jurisdiction to consider, a challenge to the manner in which ISP 
approved BAC testing methods as a basis for excluding the breath test result in 
the criminal case. 
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"Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless 
expressly authorized by statute." Laughy v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 149 Idaho 
867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1 )); Johnson v. 
State, 153 Idaho 246, 250, 280 P.3d 749, 753 (2012) (same). Idaho Code§ 67-
5270 permits judicial review of final agency actions, including the failure of an 
agency to "issue a rule" or "to perform, any duty placed on it by law." See I.C. § 
67-5201 (3) (definition of "Agency action"); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 871, 243 P.3d at 
1059 (summarizing "types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court"). 
However, in order to be entitled to such review, the "person aggrieved by final 
agency action" must comply with the procedural requirements of I.C. §§ 67-5271 
through 67-5279. I.C. § 67-5270(2); BV Beverage Co., LLC v. State, 155 Idaho 
624, 627, 315 P.3d 812, 815 (2013); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 
1058. Where, as here, the aggrieved person is challenging the validity of a 
"rule," compliance with the procedural requirements necessary to obtain judicial 
review requires the person to, among other things: exhaust all available 
administrative remedies (I.C. § 67-5271), institute proceedings for review or 
declaratory judgment by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which 
the final agency action was taken or where the aggrieved person resides (1.C. § 
67-5272(1 )), file the petition within two years of the adoption of the rule being 
challenged (I.C. §§ 67-5231 and 67-5273), and make the agency a party to the 
action (I.C. § 67-5278). Riendeau did not comply with any of these procedural 
requirements, nor could he ever have done so in the criminal case. 
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From the beginning of this case, Riendeau has sought a judicial ruling 
invalidating the SOPs for BAC testing based on ISP's failure to have complied 
with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the testing 
methods contained in the SOPs. But Riendeau himself did not comply with the 
judicial review provisions of the IAPA. To the state's knowledge, he did not 
attempt to pursue any available administrative remedies. 4 I.C. § 67-5271. Nor 
did he "institute" any "proceedings for review or declaratory judgment" by filing a 
timely petition in the district court of the appropriate county and naming ISP as a 
party to the action. I.C. §§ 67-5272, 67-5273, 67-5278. Instead, Riendeau has 
attempted to have the SOPs invalidated as a basis for excluding his breath test 
result in the criminal case. Nothing in the IAPA or in any other statute, including 
I.C. § 18-8004, enables Riendeau to challenge the validity of ISP's action in this 
forum and in this manner. Riendeau's attempt to do so is, in his own words, 
nothing more than an attempt to make "an end-run around the requirements" of 
the IAPA. (Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
4 The state confesses is not aware of any specific administrative remedy by 
which Riendeau could challenge the validity of ISP's adoption of the SOPs and 
methods for BAC testing contained therein. Although I.C. § 18-8002A(7) allows 
for an administrative hearing when a person's driver's license has been 
suspended as a result of failing a BAG test, failure of ISP to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods for BAG testing is 
not one of the grounds upon which the license suspension may be vacated. In 
addition, I.G. § 67-5278 appears to contemplate that the validity of an agency 
rule may be challenged in an action for declaratory judgment, without the 
necessity of exhausting administrative remedies. See also Asarco, Inc. v. State, 
138 Idaho 719, 69 P.3d 139 (2003) (mining companies did not have to exhaust 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of validity of state 
agency's action in issuing a total maximum daily load limit without complying with 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA). 
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Because there is no statute that authorizes Riendeau to raise ISP's 
alleged noncompliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA as a 
defense in the criminal case, Riendeau lacked standing to bring the challenge 
and both the lower courts and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider it. 
See Laughy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 1058 ("Without an enabling statute, 
the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" to review agency action.). If 
the IAPA applies to ISP's actions in approving methods for breath testing, it also 
applies to bar Riendeau's attempt to challenge those actions in the criminal 
case. 
3. Even If This Court Entertains The Merits Of Riendeau's Challenge 
To ISP's Approval Of BAC Testing Methods, Correct Application Of 
The Law Shows The SOPs Are Not Rules And, As Such, No 
Formal Rulemaking Was Required 
The legislature has given ISP authority to prescribe by rule "[w]hat testing 
is required to complete evidentiary testing" for alcohol concentration under I.C. § 
18-8002A and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be 
performed to comply with the department's requirements." I.C. § 18-8002(3)(a), 
(b ). Pursuant to this authority, ISP has promulgated administrative "Rules 
Governing Alcohol Testing." See Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA) 11.03.01, 
et seq. Relevant to this appeal is IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03, which governs the 
administration of breath alcohol testing. Specifically, the rule provides: 
03. Administration. Breath tests shall be administered 
in conformity with standards established by the department. 
Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing 
instrument used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the 
form of analytical methods and standard operating procedures. 
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IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03. Pursuant to its plain language - and consistent with the 
requirements of I.C. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004(4) - this rule leaves to ISP the 
task of developing standards for the administration of breath tests and of issuing 
such standards "in the form of analytical methods and standard operating 
procedures." Nowhere in this rule or in the legislative mandate of I.C. §§ 18-
8002A and 18-8004(4) is there any requirement that the SOPs themselves be 
established as rules in compliance with the IAPA. 
On appeal, Riendeau does not challenge the validity of IDAPA 
11.03.01.14.03 or contend that that rule, which expressly authorizes ISP to 
establish methods for breath testing and issue them in the form of SOPs, was 
improperly promulgated. Instead, he argues that the SOPs themselves meet the 
legal definition of an agency "rule" and, therefore, compliance with the formal 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA was required. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-20.) 
For the reasons set forth in Sections I.D.1 and I.D.2, supra, this Court should 
decline to entertain the merits of Riendeau's argument. Even if this Court does 
consider Riendeau's challenge to the validity of ISP's action in adopting the 
SOPs without engaging in formal rulemaking beyond that which occurred in 
adopting IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03, the challenge fails because the SOPs are not 
agency "rules" under the applicable law. 
An agency action is a rule only where the action in question meets all of 
six characteristics. Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723, 69 P.3d 139, 143 
(2003). Those characteristics include that the action in question "prescribes a 
legal standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute," 
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"expresses agency policy not previously expressed," and "is an interpretation of 
law or general policy." kL see also l.C. § 67-5201 (19) (definition of "Rule"). 
Where an agency merely carries forth its assigned task without creating 
additional legal requirements or interpreting law or general policy it does not 
create rules subject to the procedures of the IAPA. See Sons and Daughters of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm'n., 142 Idaho 659, 663-64, 132 P.3d 416, 420-
21 (2006) (Gaming Update not a rule where it did not prescribe a legal standard 
but merely explained existing rules); Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. Beacom, 131 
Idaho 569, 570-72, 961 P.2d 660, 661-63 (1998) (adoption of tax form to carry 
out required function of self-reporting taxes not rulemaking function). 
Applying the above principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already 
concluded that the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA do "not apply when the 
Idaho state police approves the methods for determining an individual's alcohol 
concentration." State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595, 597, 83 P.3d 139, 141 (Ct. App. 
2004) (emphasis added). In Alford, the defendant sought to exclude his BAG 
test result on the basis that ISP did not comply with the rulemaking requirements 
of the IAPA when it approved the use of the Alco-Sensor Ill, the breath-testing 
device used in Alford's case. ~ at 597-98, 83 P.3d at 141-42. Citing the 
characteristics of agency rules identified by the Idaho Supreme Court in Asarco, 
supra, the Court of Appeals determined "the Idaho state police action approving 
the use of the Alco-Sensor Ill was not rulemaking" because it neither prescribed 
any new legal standard or agency policy nor interpreted any law. ~ The Court 
reasoned: 
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The DUI statute already prescribes the legal standard limiting an 
individual's alcohol concentration. Alford has failed to demonstrate 
that any Idaho state police policy was expressed, or that any law or 
policy was interpreted, by the approval of the Alco-Sensor Ill. 
Instead, the Idaho state police properly carried out a statutory duty 
to authorize the use of certain breath-testing equipment by law 
enforcement agencies. In doing so, it identified equipment that it 
found to be suitable for such purpose. It did not create additional 
legal requirements. Thus, the state was not required to provide 
evidence of Idaho state police compliance with !APA in approving 
the use of the Alco-Sensor Ill. 
1st at 598, 83 P.3d at 142. 
Riendeau acknowledges Alford but argues the reasoning and holding 
therein are inapposite because that case "merely rul[ed] on the approval of the 
Alco-Sensor Ill for breath testing" and did not address the approval of the breath-
testing procedures set forth in the SOPs. (Appellant's brief, p.18.) Riendeau's 
attempt to distinguish Alford is unavailing. Just as the approval of breath-testing 
equipment is not rulemaking, neither is the approval of methods to conduct such 
testing according to the standards of I.C. § 18-8004(4). As correctly obseNed by 
the Court of Appeals in Alford, I.C. § 18-8004 "already prescribes the legal 
standard limiting an individual's alcohol concentration." Alford, 139 Idaho at 598, 
83 P.3d at 142. The methods for BAG testing set forth in the SOPs do not 
prescribe any new legal standard for DUI, nor do they interpret any existing law 
or policy. To the contrary, the state police action in adopting the SOPs was 
merely the carrying out of the legislative directive to approve methods for BAG 
testing pursuant to the statute. While compliance with the methods so approved 
is a prerequisite to the admissibility of breath test results in the absence of expert 
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testimony, this legal requirement exists by virtue of the enabling statute itself, 
see I.C. § 18-8004(4), not because of any action on the part of ISP. 
The methods for BAG testing set forth in the SOPs do not create any 
binding law or policy; they are merely procedural standards that, if followed by 
law enforcement, permit a BAG test result to be introduced in a criminal 
proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
Because the SOPs do not themselves prescribe or interpret any law, they are not 
"rules" to which the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA apply. 
Riendeau's arguments to the contrary are without merit and do not establish any 
basis for reversal of the magistrate's order denying his motion in limine to 
exclude his BAG test results from trial.5 
11. 
Riendeau Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
The Magistrate Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying Riendeau's 
Motion To Suppress The Breath Test Results 
A. Introduction 
Riendeau moved to suppress his breath test results, arguing that his 
consent to the BAC testing was not voluntary because it was obtained after 
Officer Rios read the ALS advisories that informed him of the administrative 
5 Even if compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving 
the methods for BAG testing contained in the SOPs were a prerequisite to the 
expedient admissibility of BAC test results under I.C. § 18-8004(4), the inability 
of the state to show such compliance would not, by itself, be grounds for 
excluding the test result. "Rather, the State, as a second option, may call an 
expert witness to establish the reliability of the test, thereby making test results 
admissible." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 737, 264 P.3d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 
2011) (citation omitted); see also I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
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license suspension that would attach if he refused the test. (R., pp. 25-37, 150-
57.) The magistrate denied the motion, and the district court affirmed, ruling that 
Riendeau's consent was constitutionally valid. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.98, Ls.8-24; R., 
pp.273-75.) 
Riendeau challenges the lower courts' rulings, arguing as he did below 
that the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Missouri v. McNeely,_ U.S._, 133 
S.Ct. 1552 (2013), invalidated Idaho's implied consent law. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.21-30.) He also argues his actual consent was not voluntary because it was 
obtained only after being read the ALS advisories that informed him he was 
"required by law" to take the test. (Id.) Neither of Riendeau's arguments have 
merit. Correct application of the law shows that implied consent is still a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement and that Riendeau impliedly consented to 
breath test in this case. To the extent Riendeau's actual consent is relevant, the 
mere fact that the officer advised Riendeau of the actual consequences that 
would result if Riendeau refused the test was not unconstitutionally coercive. 
Riendeau has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the magistrate's order 
denying his motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
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trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
C. Implied Consent Is A Viable Exception To The Warrant Requirement And 
Justified The Warrantless Evidentiary Test In This Case 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) Consent is such an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied 
consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002(1 ). State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 
P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007); State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907-08, 243 P.3d 
1093, 1095-96 (Ct. App. 2010). Under that statute "the State is entitled to 
conduct blood or breath-alcohol concentration tests of drivers suspected of DUI, 
and neither a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination nor his 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches is violated by such 
testing if it is conducted in a reasonable manner." State v. Green, 149 Idaho 
706, 709, 239 P.3d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. Wagner, 149 
Idaho 268,270, 233 P.3d 199,201 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing I.C. § 18-8002(1)). 
By accepting the privilege of driving on Idaho's roadways, Riendeau 
impliedly consented to evidentiary testing to determine his alcohol concentration, 
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provided such "testing [was] administered by a peace officer with reasonable 
grounds for suspicion of DUI." LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 909, 243 P.3d at 1097 
(citing State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712, 184 P.3d 215, 218 (Ct. App. 2008); 
I.C. § 18-8002(1 )). It is undisputed that, at the time Officer Rios administered the 
breath test to Riendeau in this case, he had reasonable suspicion that Riendeau 
was driving under the influence. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.95, L.22 - p.96, L.2, p.97, 
Ls.7-9.) It is also undisputed that the officer conducted the evidentiary testing in 
a reasonable manner. (Mag. Div Tr., p.97, L.9 - p.98, L.22.) Because the officer 
had reasonable suspicion of DUI and acted reasonably in administering the 
evidentiary testing, the warrantless testing was justified by Riendeau's implied 
consent to submit to such testing as a condition of driving on Idaho's roads. 
Riendeau argues otherwise. Specifically he argues that, after the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely,_ U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552 
(2013), implied consent is no longer a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-30.) Riendeau's assertion that McNeely-
a case addressing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement - did away with the implied consent exception to the warrant 
requirement, or re-wrote Idaho's implied consent statute, does not withstand 
scrutiny. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that consent and exigent 
circumstances are different exceptions to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 
Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable 
exception here; consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
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requirement."). The Supreme Court of the United States recognized this as well 
in McNeely. In that case the only question before the Court was "whether the 
natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency 
that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 
1556. The Court held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by 
case based on the totality of the circumstances." Jsi Thus, the issue was limited 
to "nonconsensua/ blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited 
to the exigent circumstances exception. Thus, consensual breath tests, such as 
at issue in this case, were not within the scope of either the issue or the holding 
in McNeely. 
In arguing that implied consent is no longer a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement, Riendeau summarizes the McNeely holding as follows: "[A] 
warrantless evidentiary test in a DUI case is presumptively unconstitutional, and 
a person does have the right to refuse to do the test until a warrant has been 
secured or an exception to the warrant requirement exists." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.24-25.) Even assuming, without conceding, that McNeely overruled Idaho 
precedent holding that a driver has no right to revoke his or her implied consent 
to warrantless evidentiary testing, it did not invalidate the implied consent 
exception in toto. To the contrary, in addressing whether a case-by-case 
analysis under the exigency exception would "undermine the governmental 
interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses," the Court 
specifically observed that states would still "have a broad range of legal tools to 
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enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws," including "implied consent laws." 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1565-66. The Court also cited with approval its prior 
decision in North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), which held that 
evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a blood test under implied consent laws 
is constitutionally admissible evidence of his guilt. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1566. 
Thus, far from holding that the state may not legally imply consent by a motorist, 
the Court apparently endorsed implied consent laws. 
In addition, to the extent McNeely compels the conclusion that a driver 
may revoke his or her implied consent to warrantless BAC testing, such 
conclusion is irrelevant under the facts of this case. Unlike McNeely, who 
refused to submit to evidentiary testing, Riendeau submitted without objection to 
the breath test in this case. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.98, Ls.3-22.) Having done so, and 
having otherwise impliedly consented to evidentiary testing as a condition of 
using Idaho's roads, Riendeau cannot successfully complain that the warrantless 
testing violated his constitutional rights. This is true despite Riendeau's 
assertions that his actual consent to the breath test was not voluntary. 
Implied consent is an exception to the warrant requirement different than 
actual consent, such that the state does not have to prove that a motorist who 
submitted to a BAC test under implied consent gave actual consent. State v. 
Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 409-10, 973 P.2d 758, 761-62 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(argument that "consent ... was involuntary is of no consequence because 
[motorist] had impliedly consented"). The argument that implied consent must 
26 
also meet the requirements of actual consent such as voluntariness has been 
"roundly rejected." LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911-12, 243 P.3d at 1099-100. It is 
quite clear in the law that application of the implied consent exception is not 
contingent upon the motorist having provided actual consent as well. Because 
the breath test in this case was justified by Riendeau's implied consent, the state 
did not have to demonstrate that Riendeau's actual consent was voluntary. The 
district court's appellate decision affirming the magistrate's order denying 
Riendeau's motion to suppress should therefore be affirmed on this basis. 
D. To The Extent Riendeau's Actual Consent Is Legally Relevant, The Mere 
Fact That The Officer Advised Riendeau Of The License Suspension 
Consequences That Would Result If Riendeau Refused The Test Did Not 
Render That Consent Involuntary 
Riendeau acknowledges he actually consented to take the breath test in 
this case. He argues, however, that his consent was involuntary because it was 
obtained only after Officer Rios read the ALS advisories that informed Riendeau 
of the license suspension consequences that would result if he refused to take 
the test. (Appellant's brief, pp.27-30.) For the reasons set forth in Section I1.C, 
supra, the validity of Riendeau's actual consent is irrelevant because Riendeau 
impliedly consented to BAC testing as a condition of driving on Idaho's roads. 
Even if Riendeau's consent argument were legally relevant, it still fails because 
he has failed to show his actual consent was involuntary. 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) (citations omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 
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1057 (2003); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001 ). 
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 225-26 
(citations omitted). In order to be voluntary, consent cannot be the result of 
duress or coercion, either direct or implied. & at 248. Merely informing a 
suspect that the "officer intends to do something that the officer is legally 
authorized to do under the circumstances ... does not amount to coercion." 
LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911,243 P.3d at 1099 (citing State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 
774, 779-80, 152 P.3d 645, 650-51 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
In this case, the officer obtained Riendeau's consent to breath testing 
after he read Riendeau the ALS advisories that informed him of the license 
suspension penalties he faced if he refused the test. (Mag. Div. Tr., p.98, Ls.3-
5.) Specifically, the ALS advisories informed Riendeau that he was "required by 
law to take one or more evidentiary test(s) to determine" his alcohol 
concentration and that, if he "refuse[d] to take or complete any of the offered 
tests," he would be subject to the license suspension penalties set forth in I.C. § 
18-8002. (R., p.391.) Riendeau argues that, under McNeely, supra, he had the 
right to refuse evidentiary testing and, therefore, the reading of the ALS 
advisories that advised him he had no such right necessarily coerced his 
consent. (Appellant's brief, pp.27-30.) Riendeau's argument is without merit. 
Although the ALS advisory informed Riendeau he was required by law to 
submit to BAC testing, the advisory also specifically informed Riendeau of the 
consequences of a refusal. That Riendeau was advised he would face civil 
penalties if he did not submit to the test did not render his consent to the test 
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involuntary. "The voluntariness of consent is not impaired simply because one is 
faced with two unpleasant choices." Garcia, 143 Idaho at 779, 152 P.3d at 650, 
quoted in LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911, 243 P.3d at 1099. Because the ALS 
advisories accurately informed Riendeau of the penalties he faced if he refused 
to submit to BAC testing, those advisories did not themselves amount to 
coercion rendering Riendeau's consent involuntary. LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911, 
243 P.3d at 1099. Riendeau has failed to show any basis for reversal of the 
denial of his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision affirming Riendeau's conviction for misdemeanor 
DUI. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2014. 
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